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THE BRADY RULE:
HAS ANYONE HERE SEEN BRADY?t
by

HERALD PRICE FAHRINGER*

In 1963 the United States Supreme Court decided Brady v.
Maryland,, a constitutionally triumphant decision, stating:
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 2

This important decision, which was partially concealed
beneath the surface of a busy and turbulent term, was soon to
be applauded by legal scholars all over this country. The coming of this long-awaited rule of law could be foreseen in earlier
Supreme Court decisions. The awful spectre of prosecutorial
suppression had stalked across the pages of those decisions for
more than a decade.3 Thus, the Brady rule was pulled by the
Supreme Court, yelling and screaming, into an unenlightened
age of criminal discovery.
The principal impulse for Brady grew out of an acknowledgment by the Supreme Court that the defendant's facilities
for gathering evidence are greatly disproportionate to those of
the Government's. Since the average defendant has neither the
manpower nor resources available to the Government in its
investigation of crime, the state is obliged to share the proceeds of its discoveries with the defense where that evidence is
favorable to the latter's cause. The duty of law enforcement
agencies to conduct an impartial investigation and collect all
the evidence relating to the commission of an offense is manifest. When a person is ultimately charged with a crime, the
findings of the police should be equally available to him as to the
prosecution. The Government's responsibility to the defendant is no less than the duty it owes to any other member of
society, for the investigation of crime should be designed not
only to convict the guilty but to free the innocent.
No informed person can be other than unhappy about the
t The text of this article is from a speech given by Mr. Fahringer to
the American Trial Lawyers Association in Chicago, Ill.
* B.A., M.A., Pennsylvania State University; J.D., University of Buffalo Law School, 1956. Lecturer, University of Buffalo Law School. Partner in the law firm of Lipsitz, Green, Fahringer, Roll, Schuller and James,
Buffalo, N. Y.
1373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2 Id.
at 87.
' Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) ; Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28

78

The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure

[Vol. 6:77

serious defects in the present state of discovery in American
criminal procedure. Today the only effective means of criminal
discovery for the defense lawyer is the interview with his
client. In this dark age of discovery, Brady assumes great
importance. However, the reform of criminal procedure embarked upon by the Supreme Court under the able leadership
of Chief Justice Earl Warren has apparently come to an end,
and so, too, has the expansion of the Brady doctrine. Recent
Supreme Court decisions are beginning to reflect entirely too
little concern for the inherent inequality of the litigating positions between a defendant and the Government. Therefore,
this article is designed to expose the decline of the authority of
Brady and suggest what lawyers may do to stave off its further
deterioration.
First, it must be understood that Brady acknowledged the
prosecution's advantage in its search for evidence by reason
of the special powers it possesses. For instance, there are
many occasions when witnesses feel obliged to talk to the FBI
or police but will not speak to defense counsel. Furthermore,
witnesses who are not inclined to speak to either side can be
forced by the state to testify before a grand jury under the
compulsion of a subpoena. These discovery devices are unavailable to the defense. The imbalance of these investigatory
facilities inevitably harms the defendant and can lead to an
ill-prepared defense and therefore an unfair trial. It was this
obvious inequity that led to -the birth of Brady. Since the advent of Brady signaled a new era in criminal procedure, the
history of its progeny should be briefly traced.
4
As a prelude the Supreme Court decided Napue v. Illinois,
wherein the Court held that a lie told by a government witness,
which did not concern any of the facts of the case but involved
his credibility, tainted the conviction and necessitated a new
trial. In Napue the witness testified that no one had promised
him consideration for his testimony, when in fact an assistant
district attorney had. The Court, in scalding language, denounced the Government for this failure of disclosure, and reversed Napue's conviction.
More recently, the Supreme Court again struck out at
prosecutors in Giglio v. United States,' reprimanding them for
not divulging a witness' known false testimony in a situation
almost identical to Napue. The prosecution in Giglio was
forced to acknowledge that an assistant United States attor(1957); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942) ; Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103 (1935).
4 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
5 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
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ney promised the witness he would not be prosecuted if he cooperated, but the assistant who tried the case pleaded his unawareness of that promise. The Court, in rejecting this excuse,
emphasized:
The prosecutor's office is an entity and, as such, it is the spokesman for the government. A promise made by one attorney must
be attributed, for these purposes, to the government.,
Thus, Giglio expanded the frontiers of Brady by bringing
within its territorial limits the principle that the state cannot
stand by and allow false testimony to go uncorrected, even
though unsolicited, and cannot escape the responsibility of the
actions of one attorney in the United States Attorney's office,
even though disavowed by another.
However, further growth of the Brady rule was stunted
by the Burger Court in Moore v. Illinois,7 a murder case arising
in Cook County, Illinois. There the petitioner, convicted of the
shotgun slaying of a bartender, contended that he was denied
due process because the state failed to disclose a favorable pretrial statement and a diagram demonstrating that a key government witness could not have seen the shooting. The Court,
dramatically divided, rejected the petitioner's Brady claims,
holding that in light of all the evidence, the misidentification of
the petitioner by only one witness was not material to the issue
of guilt.
Significantly, in Moore the prosecution "presented its entire file to the defense, and no further request for disclosure was
made." 8 The Court made clear its intention to adhere to the
principles of Brady and Giglio, but felt "that the present record
embraces no violation of those principles."9
The majority opinion in Moore drew an infuriated dissent
from Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Douglas, Stewart, and
Powell. Lashing back at the majority, Justice Marshall exclaimed:
There can be no doubt that there was suppression of evidence by
the state and that the evidence the state relied on was 'false' in
the sense that it was incomplete and misleading.
My reading of the case leads me to conclude that the prosecutor
Id.at 154.

7408 U.S. 786 (1972).

s Id. 795. Apparently the statement which became the subject of this
appeal was inadvertently overlooked by the prosecutor. Government counsel
stated that either it was not in his file when delivered to the defense attorney
or may have been unseen by the defense lawyer.
9 Id. at 789.

Moore, more than any other case, demonstrates the change

in the chemistry of the Supreme Court and its attitude toward the enforcement of certain constitutional rights.
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knew that evidence existed that might help the defense, that the

defense had asked to see it, and that it was never disclosed.' 0
Although the Supreme Court in Moore left the Brady rule
intact, they reshaped it somewhat by stating:
The heart of the holding in Brady is the prosecution's suppression of evidence, in the face of a defense production request,
where the evidence is favorable to the accused and is material
either to guilt or to punishment. Important, then, are (a) suppression by the prosecution after a request by the defense, (b)
the evidence is of a favorable character for the defense, and
(c) the materiality of the evidence."

This sentence, overcrowded with precepts, forms the center
of gravity of the Brady rule. Clearly, the evidence suppressed
must be favorable and material on the issue of guilt or punishment and must be requested by defense counsel.
However, there are cases where the Government's concealment of favorable evidence was so shocking that the Court was
forced to reverse the conviction even though defense counsel had
not specifically demanded the production of that proof.1 2
Some prosecutors and courts have a bad habit of using the
word "exculpatory" in defining Brady material. Although that
word was used in the Brady opinion, the restatement of the rule
in Moore clearly relates to "favorable" evidence. Obviously,
there is a vast difference between "favorable" evidence and that
which is "exculpatory."
Since the Brady decision, as analyzed in Moore, appears to
be terminal, the questions which inevitably follow in the path
of this decree essentially involve details of implementation.
IMPLEMENTING BRADY

Since the request requirement, as a predicate to the invocation of the Brady injunction, was reinforced in Moore, every
lawyer should make a demand for all Brady material in advance of trial. This is easily accomplished in a pre-trial motion requesting all evidence in the Government's possession or
under its control which is favorable to the defense.
Possible areas where favorable evidence might be located
should be specified. For instance, in a bookmaking case counsel
may be able to say that he suspects witnesses have been interId. at 808, 810.
11 Id. at 794.
12 Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967); Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842
(4th Cir. 1964); United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135 (2d
Cir. 1964); United States ex rel. Butler v. Maroney, 319 F.2d 622 (3d Cir.
1963) ; Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963); United States ex rel.
Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955); People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d
554, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1956).
10
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viewed who have designated the defendant as a bettor rather
than an acceptor of wagers. In a robbery case, the suggestion may be made that witnesses may have been interviewed
who were unable to identify the defendant as the one who committed the robbery. Honest suggestions of this nature which
can be made in good faith are limitless and achieve two purposes:
(1) they alert the prosecution to areas of evidence
which should be reviewed by him, and (2) these specific demands may embarrass the overzealous prosecutor into divulging
statements of a favorable nature.
It would seem that the record of criminal convictions of
government witnesses or any other information useful for impeachment purposes should come well within the reach of the
Brady principle.
Counsel should stress to the court that the Brady material
must be delivered before trial so that he might effectively use it.
There are occasions when witnesses will have to be interviewed,
documents secured, or time consumed in pursuing other investigatory leads. Furthermore, there is no valid reason why evidence favorable to the defense should not be disclosed before
trial, since it should result in no prejudice to the Government.
However, in most instances, courts, for one reason or another,
have been reluctant to require the prosecution to produce Brady
material at this early stage. Consequently, counsel should repeat his Brady demands during the course of the trial.
Usually, the court, acting on a Brady request, will require
government counsel to deliver to the defense any material it
considers favorable. This procedure should be strenuously objected to, and counsel should request that all unused evidence in
the Government's file be turned over to the defense so they may
decide whether or not it is favorable. This difficult judgment
process should properly be left to the singlemindedness of defense counsel, as pointed out so well in an analogous situation in
the famous Jencks case. 13 No one but defense counsel can be
trusted with this decision. Counsel may want to advise the
court that if there are names of secret informers or other information traditionally not subject to disclosure, such information may be withheld.
Since this procedure is usually unacceptable to the court,
counsel, as a last resort, should have the government's file
marked as a court exhibit and delivered to the presiding judge
so that he may conduct an independent investigation to determine whether it contains any favorable evidence. Requiring the
13 Jencks v. United States, 353

U.S. 657 (1957).
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prosecutor to deliver the file to the court for judicial examination will often have the effect of producing one or two more

statements favorable to the defense. Counsel should remind
the court that witnesses who have appeared before the grand
jury, and may have given favorable evidence, fall well within
the precincts of the Brady rule. Therefore, grand jury testimony should be produced and marked as a court exhibit for
preservation in the record in the event of appellate review.
The effective use of the Brady maxim is only limited by the
boundaries of a trial lawyer's imagination. Recently, in a case
in Cleveland, 14 counsel demanded, under the authority of Brady,
the findings of the Government's investigation of trial jurors.
The claim was made that the discovery of favorable facts in the
background of a given juror should be delivered under the spirit
and purview of Brady. Although the court rejected this claim,
a complete record was made of counsel's demands. Because of
the disposition of the case, however, the issue was never reviewed.
A more practical application may occur in a large metropolitan city like New York, where the district attorney in questioning a juror discovers that he served on another case in that
courthouse, but defense counsel is uninformed as to the outcome
of that matter. It would seem that under the spirit of Brady the
disposition of that case should be divulged if the prosecutor has
that information available to him. Counsel should persist in his
Brady demands whenever possible during a trial, designating
crevices in the case where favorable evidence might be found.
Under the Napue and Giglio interpretations of Brady, counsel should demand that the Government disclose to the defense
any witnesses who have testified either falsely or erroneously.
The use of this important precedent is all too often overlooked by
defense counsel. In any complicated trial involving a large
number of government witnesses, it is hard to imagine a case
where the Government is not going to have at least one witness
who testifies falsely about a certain fact, the truth of which is
known to the Government.
When the Government discloses Brady material which exonerates the defendant, counsel should inquire whether that
evidence was presented to the grand jury which indicted the
defendant. If it was not, counsel should move for a dismissal
of the indictment on the ground that the Government has an
obligation to submit all evidence to an investigating grand jury.
14

United States v. Connoisseur Publications, Ind. No. 68-319 (N.D.

Ohio 1972).

1972]

The Brady Rule
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS UNDER BRADY

The co-existence of Brady, Napue, Giglio, and Moore has
spawned a mass of authority which is beginning to reach unmanageable proportions. It would be hazardous to attempt to
formulate any principles from this large collection of cases, except to say that the Supreme Court's recent restrictive treatment of Brady is beginning to spread into the lower courts.
These decisions have left anything but a clear-cut trail. Indeed,
a dangerous concept which could effectively emasculate the
Brady rule is beginning to infiltrate into this body of law. In a
number of cases, circuit courts have found that the Government
had suppressed certain evidence, but fancying themselves as
trial strategists, these appellate courts have concluded that
divulgence of this evidence at trial would not have changed the
15
result.
In the Second Circuit, where Brady has suffered its greatest damage, the court has openly said that the appellant must
show that the suppressed evidence "would probably have produced a different verdict."' 6
This mutation of the Brady
rule loses sight of what actually causes the defendant's prejudice: the grave disparity between investigatory facilities. Consequently, the real damage is achieved before the trial or in the
early stages of the litigation, and it is to that period, rather than
the highly speculative impact on the jury, that the court's attention should be addressed.
Surely the Government's suppression of favorable evidence,
as in the confession cases, has a dramatic impact upon the integrity of the jury's verdict. Suppression of such evidence
should require a new trial in every case. This rationale was
17
adopted in a number of well reasoned cases.
If the Brady rule is to be demeaned by making its application turn on the facts of each case, courts will have created the
Betts18-Brady brand of nightmare and an open invitation to
perennial appellate review.
In a case relied upon by the Supreme Court in Napue, this
claim was rejected as out of hand:
A lie is a lie, no matter what its subject, and, if it is in any way
relevant to the case, the district attorney has the responsibility
and duty to correct what he knows to be false and elicit the truth.
Nor does it avail [the state] .. .to contend that defendant's guilt
15 United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1968) ; Kyle v. United

States, 297 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1961).

16 Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 514 (2d Cir. 1961).

1 United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins. 326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964)
United States ex rel. Butler v. Maroney, 319 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1963) ; Ashley
v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963).
18 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
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was clearly established or that disclosure would not have changed
the verdict . . . we may not close our eyes to what occurred; regardless of the quantum of guilt or the asserted persuasiveness
of the evidence, the episode may not be overlooked.1 '

The Second Circuit, however, in a later case, shouting from
the bottom of the legal pit it had dug for itself in Kyle and
Keogh, 2 1 attempted partial restitution by holding:
Due process requires, however, that a different rule be applied
when prosecutorial suppression has caused the evidence not to be
presented at trial. At least where the suppression is deliberate,
the defendants need only show that the evidence is material and
could, in any reasonable likelihood, have led to a different result
on retrial ....
In these cases, where there has been a considered opinion to suppress and where the 'value of the information could not have
escaped the prosecutor's attention' . . . it is not necessary to engage in any exact determination of the degree of prejudice to
1
the defendants.2

The Second Circuit has also treated differently those cases
in which a request was made for Brady material and ignored
by the prosecution, and those situations where no demand was
made. For instance, the court in Keogh pointed out:
[T]o invalidate convictions in the few cases where this is proved,
even on a fairly low showing of materiality, will have a relatively
small impact on the desired finality of judgments and will deter
conduct undermining the integrity of the judicial system. The
request cases also stand on a special footing; the prosecution
knows of the defense's interest and, if it has failed to honor this
22
even in good faith, it has only itself to blame.

This twofold rule should impress upon counsel the critical importance of making a broad and comprehensive demand for
Brady material both before and during trial.
In an effort to preserve the Brady rule, counsel should persuade appellate judges to resist the temptation of becoming
trial strategists and of deciding the usefulness of any particular piece of evidence to the defense. When the court engages

in these tactics, it plays a dangerous game with jurisprudence.
Surely defense counsel is in a much better position to decide
how this concealed evidence would be helpful to his client. A
reasonable doubt can be created in a juror's mind by the small-

est piece of evidence or a single word. When guilt or innocence
10 People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.S.2d 554, 557, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887 (1956).
See also Judge Magruder's concurring opinion in Coggins v. O'Brien, 188
F.2d 130, 139 (1st Cir. 1951).
20 Note 15 supra.
21 United States v. Mele, 462 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1972).
22 391 F.2d at 148.
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trembles in the trial balance, the slightest impeaching evidence
may alter the scales, turning defeat into victory. If this practice engaged in by appellate judges continues unabated, Brady
will inevitably lose much of its meaningfulness to an accused.
Counsel should also argue that if appellate courts continue
to turn their backs on these official misadventures engaged in by
prosecutors, they will have sponsored prosecutorial irresponsibility. The only way these disgraceful failures in the administration of justice can be corrected is by reversing convictions
and granting new trials.
Despite repeated warnings by appellate courts against
these tactics, prosecutors persist in exploiting the unfair advantage of withholding evidence they believe is harmful to their
cases. If they are not taught once and for all that this conduct will not be tolerated, these abuses are bound to continue.
No greater responsibility rests with any court than that of insuring the fair prosecution of criminal cases.
Another trend emerging in some decisions subverting the
Brady doctrine involves the defendant's knowledge of the favorable evidence. A number of courts have seized upon collateral
language from a concurring opinion in Giles v. Maryland,23 a
descendant of Brady, providing: "[A]ny allegation of suppression boils down to an assessment of what the State knows ...

in

comparison to the knowledge held by the defense. ' 24 Accordingly,
courts have held that if a defendant knows of the existence of
favorable evidence, the Government has no duty to disclose this
material in their file. 25 Although there appears to be a surface
logic in these decisions, a closer inspection shows that they are
constructed on a faulty premise, which substantially undermines the validity of the conclusions reached. There are many
occasions when the defense may know of the existence of witnesses, or even possible documentary evidence in the form of
police records, but that evidence is unavailable. More often
than not, the witnesses will not speak to defense counsel, and
the subpoenaing of some forms of police records is impracticable. Therefore, these decisions of low visibility have inflicted
critical wounds on the Brady rule. It will thus be all too easy
for prosecutors now to argue, in instances where evidence has
been withheld, that the defense had or should have had knowledge of those sources.
In this area of controversy, the only constitutionally accep23 386 U.S. 66 (1967)
24

(White, J. concurring).

Id. at 96.

25 United States v. Ruggiero, 469 F.2d 1404 (2d Cir. 1973), aff'd, 308 F.
Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ; Moynahan v. McDonald et al, 471 F.2d 700 (2d
Cir. 1973) ; see, e.g., Xydas v. United States, 445 F.2d 660 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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table rule should be based upon a clear showing that the concealed evidence was not only known to the defense, but was also
available and easily producible at trial. For instance, where
witnesses cannot be found or will not speak to defense counsel,
there is no valid reason why, under Brady's mandate, this
evidence should not be divulged to the defense. If these senseless distinctions are allowed to continue to debase the Brady
rule, it will eventually lose its impact as a working legal principle.
CONCLUSION

Courts must hold prosecutors to their duty to conduct
themselves as seekers of justice, rather than advocates privileged to win their cases by any means available. Civilized
standards of justice require that prosecutors reveal all evidence
which may have any value to the defense if the concept of fair
trials is to remain meaningful. Allowing prosecutors and
judges to decide what evidence will be helpful to the defense
desperately interferes with the adversary process. In most
instances the delivery 'of the requested evidence is not harmful
to the Government but, on the other hand, is usually most helpful to the accused. Withholding Brady evidence from the defense is inexcusable.
Today the Government's monopoly of investigative agencies
in criminal cases means that a defendant faces a far more efficient fact-gathering adversary than he did a decade ago.
Prosecutors are now in a better position than ever to hinder
a defendant's access to witnesses before trial. Under these
frightening circumstances, the Brady doctrine assumes even
greater importance, and must not be allowed to deteriorate.
Finally, it must be said that in today's constitutional climate there is little an accused can find to please him in the
current developments in the criminal trial process. The greatest challenge facing the courts today is one of avoiding indifference and steeling themselves against the hysterical cry of
the crowd for law and order. Today, in the zeal to punish offenders either identified with organized crime, or those who
appear to be guilty, appellate courts have occasionally resorted
to unworthy means in affirming convictions. The disingenuous
treatment of precedent and the slipshod handling of case facts
are becoming all too common. These unfortunate techniques
are often employed to rationalize results that otherwise could
not be legally justified. Our courts must resist these temptations and bravely meet these challenges. And when they succeed, as we know they can, courage and leadership will have
played a significant part in this profound achievement.

